This weekend, I shared with a friend what I learned about psychology from rereading The Warren Buffett Way by Robert Hagstrom. One of the things he found interesting was the concept of impetuosity and how it negatively impacts investors.

Impetuosity is the tendency to act quickly, without thinking about the consequences. It can be considered a casino mentality—an itch to go into action. You get caught up in what other people are doing and place a bet or make an investment without taking time to think it through.

Impetuosity can result in investors making bets when the probabilities are against them, upsides are low, and downside risks are high.

This section of the book reminded me of 2020 and 2021. ZIRP made investors comfortable paying high valuations for a growth company. Early-stage venture capital deals were getting done in a few days with limited diligence. In 2022 and 2023, companies that raised at these high valuations and didn’t grow into them struggled to raise capital. Some raised down rounds with brutal terms. Some didn’t make it.

Looking back, it was a period of impetuosity. Investors were doing deals they otherwise wouldn’t have because of what other investors were doing. Founders were raising at sky-high valuations because other founders were. Many didn’t think about the long-term consequences. They were caught up in the hype, doing what seemed normal.

Some founders and investors were aware of impetuosity and recognized what was happening. They took note and acted differently. The shrewd investors were selling assets at peak prices, not buying. And the shrewd founders were raising reasonable sums at valuations that wouldn’t hinder future fundraising, or they were selling their companies outright at peak multiples.

Hagstrom details how Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger avoided impetuosity. The most important thing they did before making an investment was calculate the probability that it would be favorable for them. If it wasn’t favorable, they continually took in more information and monitored the situation. They had the patience to wait until the odds were in their favor, which reduced their risk of losing money. And if the odds tilted in their favor, their research and calculated probability gave them the confidence to bet big even when others were doing the opposite.

Their use of facts and probabilities helped them act counter to the crowd and overcome impetuosity.

I’m wrapping up The Warren Buffett Way by Robert Hagstrom for the second time. The first time I read it last year, I got a ton of information about the mechanics of how Warren Buffett invests. This time, I’ve gotten just as much, but more around psychology and mindset. It’s interesting how the book hasn’t changed, but what I got from it changed because what I’m interested in has changed.

The book helped me understand how a rational temperament is Buffett’s main competitive advantage. Here’s a passage that stuck with me:

The cornerstone of rationality is the ability to see past the present and analyze several possible scenarios, eventually making a deliberate choice. That, in a nutshell, is Warren Buffett.

Speaking to students at the University of Seattle, Buffett was asked how he got where he is and how he amassed such a large fortune. His response was thought provoking:

Buffett took a deep breath and began:

How I got here is pretty simple in my case. It is not IQ, I’m sure you will be glad to hear. The big thing is rationality. I always look at IQ and talent as representing the horsepower of the motor, but that the output—the efficiency with which the motor works—depends on rationality. A lot of people start out with 400-horsepower motors but only get 100 horsepower of output. It’s way better to have a 200-horsepower motor and get it all into output.

So why do smart people do things that interfere with getting the output they’re entitled to? It gets into the habits and character and temperament, and behaving in a rational manner. Not getting in your own way. As I have said, everybody here has the ability absolutely to do anything I do and much beyond. Some of you will, and some of you won’t. For those who won’t, it will be because you get in your own way, not because the world doesn’t allow you.

I’ve always thought high IQ is an edge. High mental acuity is genetic—you were either born with it or weren’t. But Buffett makes a great point about the efficiency with which someone uses their mental acuity materially impacting their output. You don’t have to be the smartest to win; you just need to avoid acting illogically.

You can’t change your IQ, but you can learn to think and act more rationally. This is a superpower hiding in plain sight. It’s something that everyone can do, but as with many superpowers hiding in plain sight, many people won’t.

Buffett built a fortune buying and overseeing businesses by being rational (he’s also pretty sharp). Entrepreneurs of all IQ levels should take note of his simple, but not easy, strategy and borrow a page from the Buffett playbook. Being rational and not shooting yourself in the foot is something everyone can do. It trumps intelligence in the long run and can lead to outsize success.

Some passages in The Warren Buffett Way by Robert Hagstrom reminded me of this post from a few months ago. I shared that taxes are a successful entrepreneur’s biggest expense. Allocating appropriate time to optimizing that expense, just as entrepreneurs do with all other major expenses, can have a material impact on a company’s ability to reinvest in growth opportunities. Here are the passages:

Except in the case of nontaxable accounts, taxes are the biggest expense that investors face—higher than brokerage commissions and often higher than the expense ratio of running a fund.

In a nutshell, the key strategy involves another of those commonsense notions that is often underappreciated: the enormous value of the unrealized gain. When a stock appreciates in price but is not sold, the increase in value is an unrealized gain. No capital gains tax is owed until the stock is sold. If you leave the gain in place, your money compounds more forcefully.

Overall, investors have too often underestimated the enormous value of this unrealized gain—what Buffett calls an “interest-free loan from the Treasury.” To make his point, Buffett asks us to imagine what happens if you buy a $1 investment that doubles in price each year. If you sell the investment at the end of the first year, you would have a net gain of $0.66 (assuming you’re in the 34 percent tax bracket). Let’s say you reinvest the $1.66 and it doubles in value by the second year-end. If the investment continues to double each year, and you continue to sell, pay the tax, and reinvest the proceeds, at the end of 20 years you have a net gain of $25,200 after paying taxes of $13,000. If, instead, you purchase a $1 investment that doubles each year and is not sold until the end of 20 years, you would gain $692,000 after paying taxes of approximately $356,000.

This is a great mathematical example demonstrating the power of compounding and the impact taxes can have on investment returns over a long period. It reminded me that playing the long game in investing gives you twin tailwinds, which can lead to explosive results.

I’m rereading The Warren Buffett Way by Robert Hagstrom. I enjoyed this book last year, and I decided to read it again after reading Hagstrom’s book Warren Buffett: Inside the Ultimate Money Mind.

The book contains lots of insightful information about Buffett’s investing approach and how he thinks about capital allocations as the CEO of Berkshire Hathaway. One part of the book I found invaluable was the chapter called “Common Stock Purchases.” In this chapter, Hagstrom walks through Buffett’s process to analyze and value nine of his biggest investments: GEICO, Capital Cities/ABC, Coca-Cola, and others.

Many people are familiar with Buffett’s investing strategy, but how he applied it when making investment decisions isn’t always clear. Hagstrom explains how Buffett valued each company and compares his valuations to the prices he paid. He walks through the math and shows how Buffett’s investments were made for prices below the intrinsic values that Buffett calculated. Buying for less than intrinsic value is core to his strategy of investing only when there’s a margin of safety.

I noticed that Buffett sometimes broke his own rules, such as when he invested in GEICO. Buffett usually invests only in companies with a consistent operating history that are generating increased free cash flow. However, when he invested significantly in GEICO in 1976, the company was on the verge of bankruptcy, had zero earnings, and needed a turnaround. Over several years, Buffett bought roughly 33% of the company. Hagstrom does a great job of detailing why he made this seemingly risky investment. Needless to say, Buffett was right, as GEICO is now a household name. This example reinforces that rules sometimes need to be broken when great investing opportunities present themselves. It also shows how Buffett spent decades preparing for this investment by reading and learning about insurance, and how that preparation positioned him to act swiftly when he needed to.

Today, I chatted with an entrepreneur who owns a retail company about what can be done to grow sales. One of the projects mentioned was improving the functionality of its website. The entrepreneur views money spent that way as a cost and wants to spend as little as possible. This perspective got me thinking.

Entrepreneurs should keep a close eye on costs. The old saying, “If you watch the pennies, the dollars will take care of themselves,” is true. The best entrepreneurs keep costs under control.

However, expenses and investments are different. An expense is a cost to operate a business that generally covers only a year. Think insurance, taxes, rent, salary, etc. An investment creates an asset that produces revenue (and hopefully profits) for years. An investment should generate a return.

The entrepreneur I was talking with today was thinking of money spent on an ecommerce website as an expense, but I think it’s an investment. A website is an asset that, if properly built, can drive revenue and create a return on the money invested for years.

Entrepreneurs have a dual role. They should manage the costs of the company to ensure short-term profitability. But they’re also capital allocators who must invest profits in ways that will help the company grow long term. Treating investments as expenses will improve short-term profitability at the expense of long-term viability.

The IPO market for technology companies has been slow (see here). I’ve been curious why that’s the case (see here). Klaviyo is a known technology company that IPO’d in September 2023. I came across an interview with the CEO and co-founder, Andrew Bialecki. The interview caught my attention because he discusses initially bootstrapping and growing to over $1 billion in revenue and a market capitalization (i.e., valuation) of over $10 billion as of this writing.

One section of the interview addressed what he thinks the criteria are for technology companies to go public or, said differently, what a company needs to demonstrate to get public market investors to buy its stock and have a successful IPO. Here are the criteria:

• Positive free cash flow – the company needs to generate, not consume, cash.
• Sustainable business – The company provides a product or service that customers will value in future years.
• Durable growth – The company must be growing at a healthy rate. The smaller the revenue base, the higher the growth rate investors want to see. The growth rate must also be durable for the next four or five years.

Growing at a rapid rate that’s durable while not burning money isn’t easy to do. Many technology companies can achieve high growth rates, but they burn a ton of cash to accomplish this.

Bialecki’s perspective on the current IPO market for tech companies is valuable, given he’s one of the few who has successfully completed a technology IPO in the last two or so years.

He shares other great nuggets during the interview. If you want to hear just the section on his thoughts on IPOs, see here, but I found the entire interview worthwhile.

I did some research after my posts on IPOs and venture capital (see here and here). Through friends at VC firms, I learned how one early-stage VC firm is thinking about exits.

The VC firm is concerned by the lack of tech IPOs because it makes it difficult for them to return cash to the limited partners (LPs) who invested in their funds. These LPs are less likely to invest in their new funds if they don’t see cash distributions from funds they already invested in. To raise new funds, VCs must exit existing portfolio companies and return that cash to LPs. To address this, the VC firm has instituted a liquidity planning strategy. Here’s what they’re doing:

• Building relationships with investment banks and deepening existing relationships so they can better understand and monitor the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) market
• Hiring a team member specifically focused on growth equity and M&A who will be part of the investment team
• Conducting biweekly liquidity planning meetings whose priority is equal to that of their weekly deal flow meetings
• Educating CEOs of portfolio companies on liquidity planning

The second and third points caught my attention. They show how important the issue of exits has become to this firm. Their strategy highlights that they’ll aim for IPOs to exit their investments in portfolio companies. They plan to lean heavily into M&A and make them a priority.

I’ll keep digging into this more. As I do, I suspect I’ll start hearing more about secondary sales being part of strategy at some early-stage firms.

Yesterday I shared an update on 2024 initial public offering (IPO) stats. A conversation with a friend at a family office sparked that post. When a company completes an IPO, it sells part of the company to public market investors via stock exchanges (usually NYSE or NASDAQ). When a company begins trading on a public stock exchange, shares in the company are more liquid. Selling all or part of an ownership stake just takes clicking a button; the cash shows up in your brokerage account instantly. Selling a stake in a private company requires more time and energy. You must find a willing buyer, agree on a price, and complete the transaction. It’s inefficient and some deals move slowly, if they get done at all.

IPOs are significant milestones for venture capital investors, one of the preferred ways to exit their portfolio companies and get publicity for themselves.

As I shared yesterday, the technology-heavy NASDAQ Composite Index is near its record-high closing price this week. The high, from July of this year, is 18,647. Earlier this week, it closed at 18,573. This year, the market has trended upward, making new all-time highs. I take that as a sign that public market investors are in a buying mood (they’re doing more buying than selling, which increases prices). Also, the prominent tech companies that IPO’d in the last year or so have seen their stock prices perform well. Klaviyo, Instacart, and Reddit are all trading near record highs, although the journey to their all-time-highs was bumpy for some of them.

So if public market investors are in a buying mood and they’re buying technology companies that recently IPO’d, why haven’t more entrepreneurs and venture capital investors taken technology companies public this year? How will venture capitalists exit their investments if they can’t or won’t take companies public? These are the questions I was talking to my friend about this week. I don’t have definitive answers, but seeing how this plays out over the rest of this year and in 2025 will be interesting.

This week, I talked about venture capital with a friend at a family office. We talked about venture capital investors’ ability to exit via the IPO market, and I realized I hadn’t checked the IPO stats since I shared early 2024 stats in March. Here are the IPO stats through October 23, 2024:

• 2024: 178

Here are previous years’ IPO stats:

• 2023: 154
• 2022: 181
• 2021: 1,035
• 2020: 480
• 2019: 232

IPO activity has picked up. The number of IPOs in 2024 has already exceeded 2023’s figure and will certainly exceed 2022’s. However, IPO activity is still low—even when compared to 2019’s pre-COVID level.

I’m surprised we haven’t had more tech companies IPO—especially since recently IPO’d tech companies such as Reddit, Instacart, and Klaviyo are all trading near all-time-highs (as of this writing). Another surprising data point is that the stock market has been near its all-time high this week. The technology-heavy NASDAQ Composite Index approached its record-high closing price this past week. The high, from July of this year, is 18,647. Earlier this week, it closed at 18,573.

I find it interesting that venture capitalists and technology entrepreneurs aren’t taking companies public via IPOs, given the current public market conditions.

If you want to see the latest or historical IPO stats, look here.

After I wrote a post earlier this week, I became more curious about Reddit’s business and how it complements the Newhouse family’s media empire. I shared some reported numbers about the business in that post but didn’t dig into the business or its SEC filings.

When I get some bandwidth, I’ll read its entire form S-1 SEC filing and maybe its latest 10-Q filing too. It’s a pretty nerdy thing to do, but I always learn a ton when I read S-1s about companies I’m interested in (see here and here). I have some other filings in my queue to read first, but I’ll share what I learn from Reddit’s filings when I finish reading them.