As I’ve been reading Cable Cowboy: John Malone and the Rise of the Modern Cable-TV Business, I’ve gotten a clearer picture of John Malone. Malone is brilliant and shrewd. I’d consider him more of a financial engineer than anything else. He excelled at deal making, strategy, and capital allocation—but not at building a cable service customers loved or a company that was sustainable long-term.

Between 1973 and 1989, he completed 482 deals, or one every two weeks or so. From the company’s low in 1974, not long after Malone joined, through mid 1989, the stock rose 55,000 percent, a spectacular return.

Malone’s constant deal making created remarkable shareholder value. But it came at a cost. Customers hated TCI. Malone’s goal was to charge as much as possible for his service but spend as little providing it as he could get away with. This strategy maximized cash flow but resulted in notoriously poor customer service, massive rate hikes, unreliable service technicians, and inconsistent cable service. TCI’s poor reputation with customers and its business practices (including others not mentioned here) led to Malone being forced to appear before Congress to defend himself and TCI’s business practices. He and various state and federal politicians became enemies. TCI’s shareholders were happy, but Malone and the company were under constant attack.

Malone was in a service-oriented business selling to consumers, but he didn’t approach it that way. He focused on engineering financial outcomes, not making customers happy. He got the financial returns he wanted, but he and TCI were vilified by customers, politicians, and competitors. It all took a toll on Malone over the years. As I read this part of the book, I couldn’t help but wonder if all the hate he encountered was worth it. Couldn’t he have gotten a similar outcome if he built something people loved, not hated?

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Last week I learned about John Malone while reading The Outsiders: Eight Unconventional CEOs and Their Radically Rational Blueprint for Success. This inspired me to buy and begin reading Cable Cowboy: John Malone and the Rise of the Modern Cable-TV Business.

Tele-Communications Inc. (TCI) was a cable company founded by rancher and cottonseed salesman Bob Magness. TCI laid wires to allow cable to reach homes and charged monthly fees for access to its infrastructure and programming.

Magness used debt to expand TCI and got in over his head. In 1972, he recruited Malone to get the company’s finances in order and take it to the next level.

Malone focused on increasing the long-term value of TCI, not short-term profits. He ignored reported profits and concentrated on the company’s cash flows, not net income. He reinvested cash flow in ways that would generate a high return and increase TCI’s market capitalization (i.e., valuation). Here are two key things I noticed Malone did:

• Depreciation – Cable systems were depreciable assets. Once a system was acquired, TCI depreciated this cost over time, which minimized (and often eliminated) TCI’s tax bill. The lower the tax bill, the more cash TCI had to buy more cable systems. The more cable systems TCI purchased, the more cash flow Malone had to reinvest and the more depreciation lowered TCI’s tax bill. The bigger the system became, the more subscribers Malone had to use as leverage in negotiations.  
• Programming – Cable system operators thought programming was a commodity they had to pay for. Malone realized programming companies were valuable because they had two revenue streams: advertising and payments from cable systems (like TCI) based on subscribers. New channels increased fees to cable systems as popularity increased. Malone realized that owning part of new programming (i.e., new cable channels) would allow TCI to profit twice by owning “both the pipe and the water flowing through it.” He could offer new channels broad distribution early and negotiate lower programming rates for TCI, a win-win. Malone started seeding new cable networks. He provided capital and access to subscribers in his system in exchange for 20% of new programming channels.

Malone ended up building a powerful flywheel that increased TCI’s long-term value. The more cable systems he bought, the more cash flow and subscribers he had. The more subscribers and cash he had, the more leverage he had with new cable channels. The more these new channels succeeded, the more revenue they had and the more valuable they became. The more valuable new programmers became, the more valuable TCI became.

Using this approach, Malone ended up owning stakes in BET, the Discovery Channel, the Family Channel, and others.

I haven’t finished the book yet, but I can already see why Malone is considered one of the best capital allocators.

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I’m wrapping up reading The Perfect Store: Inside eBay, which describes eBay’s early days (through 2001) in great detail. eBay’s growth was astonishing. In September 1999, four years after Pierre Omidyar created an online auction in his spare time, the company had 1,500 employees (half of whom had been hired in the last six months) and hosted $5 billion in annual auctions.

International growth was a significant growth strategy, and lessons can be learned from eBay’s experiences:

Germany

• In March 1999, six friends studied eBay and decided to launch a German version. They called it Alando.
• Alando acquired 50,000 users and 250,000 listings in two months, which indicates that Germans were adopting the internet rapidly.
• eBay took notice. In June 1999, eBay bought Alando for $42 million in stock.

United Kingdom (UK)

• UK consumers paid their phone company to surf the web by the minute, an expensive proposition.
• eBay decided to hire UK talent and build a site from scratch. It launched eBay UK in July 1999.
• Within a year, eBay UK surpassed its main competition, QXL.

Japan

• Japan was the second-biggest internet market in the world and growing.
• In 1999, Yahoo offered to partner with eBay on a Japanese auction site. Softbank, a Japanese telecommunications company, was a major Yahoo investor and understood Japan. eBay declined to partner, perceiving the terms as unfavorable.  
• In the fall of 1999, Yahoo Japan launched its auction site.
• In February 2000, eBay launched its auction site.
• In 2001, eBay Japan had 4,000 listings and was ranked fourth in the country, while Yahoo Japan had 2 million listings and ranked first.

By the first quarter of 2000, eBay UK and Germany realized $87 million in combined auction volume, double the volume of European rivals. eBay deemed its upstart European sites successes. Japan, however, was a disappointment and a missed opportunity.

When a company expands outside its core geography, it often evaluates building versus buying. Cultural and other factors must be considered. One that’s important is the growth rate in the target geography: how fast is the number of people experiencing the problem growing?

The UK market grew slowly, so eBay could afford to build a solution from scratch. But in the rapid-internet-adoption markets of Germany and Japan, building from scratch meant ceding market share to competitors who had closely watched eBay’s success in the U.S. and understood their home markets better.

eBay learned from its Japan experience and, in 2001, bought the majority of Internet Auction Ltd, South Korea’s largest online auction. This gave eBay a dominant position in Asia’s second-largest internet economy—but even that couldn’t make up for eBay’s decision in Japan. Without that country, the second-largest internet market in the world, eBay couldn’t have a dominant position in Asia when the book was written. That title went to Yahoo, and so did the revenue and profits associated with it.

eBay CEO Meg Whitman openly regretted not partnering with Yahoo. Opting to build rather than buy meant that competitors satisfied consumers’ needs while eBay was building and figuring out cultural norms. Convincing them to switch after their needs were already being met proved difficult and cost eBay revenue and profits.

Instacart’s largest revenue segment is its marketplace and delivery business connecting buyers and sellers and facilitating delivery of purchased items. Instacart gets a percentage of every transaction as revenue; i.e., a take rate. Let’s hypothetically say that Instacart’s take rate is 5%. For every $10 purchase on its marketplace, Instacart generates $0.50 in revenue. The take rate can be charged to the buyer, seller, or both.

The take-rate revenue model allows companies to increase their revenue as the value they provide increases. This is good, but this revenue has an overlooked downside. As a former customer of various marketplaces and software companies that used take-rate revenue models, I’ve experienced it firsthand, and I’ve watched other entrepreneurs have a similar experience.

As a customer’s merchandise volume on the marketplace or software platform grows, the take-rate dollars become larger, even if the percentage is flat. The larger the take-rate fees become, the more visible they are to the customer’s internal decision-makers. Five percent of $1,000 is $50 and may be an overlooked expense. But 5% of $1,000,000 is $50,000, which is less likely to be overlooked.

Imagine that a customer reviews its P&L, and someone asks, why are we paying XYZ Company so much money every month? That amount could materially boost our margins or support growth plans. They do some forecasting and start thinking about ways to replace the marketplace or software provider (if possible) or reduce its fees. The customer’s perspective changes. It no longer views XYZ Company as a partner that provides more value than it charges for. Instead, it sees XYZ as a company whose cost exceeds its value. The customer wants the cost it incurs to better align with or be less than the value it feels it’s receiving.

When the customer’s perspective changes, the relationship and interactions change. When the dollars at stake are high, the relationship can become adversarial. If your biggest customers are constantly fighting you, it takes a toll on your team and in extreme cases can affect the culture of your company. 

The various lawsuits over the years against Visa and Mastercard by retailers, Block, and other partners over take-rate fees are great examples of what I’m describing.

Take-rate revenue models work, but this dynamic is something founders considering them should be aware of. The good news is that take-rate revenue models can be crafted in various ways that prevent some of this tension with your largest customers.

I’m friends with an entrepreneur running an automotive service business focused on consumers. He’s been at it several years and is thinking about possibly selling the business one day. He would need to grow revenue and increase margins to make it attractive for acquisition. He has various ideas about how to do this, but his current model creates obstacles:

• Consumers need his service only once every five to ten years, so he must acquire new customers every month.
• Consumers view his service as an expense (i.e., its cost exceeds its perceived value) and negotiate hard, which negatively impacts margins.
• Managing relationships with consumers is a constant pain point for his staff and requires that he run at elevated staff levels, reducing margins.
• Each consumer has a different car, which adds operational complexity to servicing vehicles and reduces throughput.

He recently shared an idea he’s experimenting with. The automotive service he offers is something fleet owners can use too. Instead of continuing to focus on consumers (B2C), he may switch to targeting businesses (B2B). Here’s what he learned from some customer discovery:

• Small fleet owners are growing in his area.
• Each vehicle in a fleet needs to be serviced annually, so he could expect monthly repeat business.
• Down vehicles reduce revenue, so fleet owners view his service as helping them generate revenue (i.e., its perceived value exceeds its cost), which positively impacts margins.
• Working with repeat fleet owners simplifies relationship management, reducing the burden on his team and making it possible to operate with a smaller team, thereby increasing margins.
• Fleet owners buy the same vehicles, which simplifies operations and increases throughput.

Through trial and error, this entrepreneur has learned a valuable lesson: why some businesses are better suited to focusing on other businesses (not consumers) as their core customers.

It’s early, but I suspect this entrepreneur will pivot his business from B2C to B2B and finally reach the scale and profitability that’s eluded him thus far.

Today I heard about an interesting technique. The objective is to improve your decision-making by getting feedback on the thought process you used to make a decision, not the outcome. The outcome of a decision isn’t a reflection of decision quality. Bad decisions end up turning out well, and vice versa, because of chance and randomness.

The technique involves sharing your thought process, including the variables you considered, with credible people who make good decisions. How did you think about the decision? What information did you factor in? The twist is that you don’t share outcomes with them (ask for feedback on decisions that have had good and bad outcomes). These people then explain the shortcomings and strengths they see in your thought process. They might even tell you how they would approach the decision if they were in your shoes. From all this feedback, you’ll learn how other people approach making decisions and improve your own decision-making.

This technique caught my attention because most people ask for feedback on decisions by leading with the outcome. This is completely different but makes a lot of sense to me (in theory). I’m curious to try it out and see how it works in practice.

A friend sent me an article about private equity consolidating segments of the automotive market, specifically tires and service centers. CCAW Automotive Group operated in this market, so I know it well.

I’m not surprised that private equity is targeting this market, because it’s fragmented and inefficient and requires significant capital to hold inventory. Rising interest rates are likely pressuring profitability of smaller players. This makes the market attractive to private equity funds looking to execute a roll-up strategy. In my opinion, it’s really the only viable strategy for this mature industry. Growth is slow (probably 3%–5% annually), so growing organically is hard because you mostly have to take customers from someone else. Buying smaller players and integrating them into a larger organization so economies of scale can be leveraged is a good strategy.

I wouldn’t be surprised to see private equity consolidate parts of this industry and then sell to a large upstream player (manufacturer, distributer, etc.) who could benefit strategically and financially. Then again, the consolidated segments could be taken public if market conditions are favorable. I’m curious to see how this plays out and hope the end result is a better experience for consumers.

Financial services for consumers and small businesses is likely the next big market for Apple (see my posts here and here). In October, Apple announced a new savings account product. And today, Apple announced that the product is live and paying a competitive 4.15% APY. Given the Silicon Valley Bank failure and the changing banking landscape, Apple may have decided to use challenges that traditional banks are encountering to its advantage.

I think the banking industry is prime for disruption. Banking has been slow to evolve, which frustrates consumers and small businesses. I can’t wait to see how consumers and the banking industry respond to Apple’s latest foray into financial services.

Looks like we’re one step closer to iBank.

I’ve thought for a few years that financial services is the next big market for Apple (see my posts). It’s a massive market that the iPhone puts the company in prime position to disrupt.

Today I watched a Wall Street Journal video about the competition between Apple and traditional banks. The gist was that Apple’s digital wallet is gaining market share for consumer payments. That is, consumers are using this digital wallet to make more of their purchases. Banks have taken notice and worked together to create a competing wallet called Paze. Paze is young and there isn’t a ton of information about it out yet, but I’m curious to see how banks plan to convince consumers to adopt Paze. Distribution (getting the solution in the hands of users) matters, and it’s not clear to me how Paze will compete with the distribution Apple offers via the iPhone.

The stakes are high, and it will be interesting to see how this war plays out. Regardless, I like the fact that Apple’s presence is forcing banks to innovate and offer better solutions to consumers and small businesses.

I had a conversation today about negotiations—something everyone will encounter in their life. They can be as complicated as working out deal terms for a large investment in a company or as simple as a child trying to convince their parents they should have a later bedtime. The most common example I heard people talk about today was negotiating salary with an employer.

Books and strategies on negotiating abound. I don’t think there’s a right or wrong approach, only what’s ideal for the personality of the person doing the negotiating. (Note: there are some things everyone should avoid!)

Understanding the person you’re negotiating with is important. Understanding their negotiating style can inform how you negotiate. But it isn’t always easy to understand someone’s style. One of the people I chatted with shared a straightforward approach to quickly understanding someone’s style: at the beginning of the conversation, ask them: “What’s your negotiating style?” In his experience, most people will be caught off guard. Either they’ll tell you how they negotiate, or their response will give you clues about their style. For example, someone will say they’re a straight shooter. Someone else, to keep from showing their hand, won’t give you clear answers. Either way, you’ve learned something about their negotiating style that’s useful.

I like this direct approach and plan to use it when I negotiate with someone for the first time.